


2 Decergra 194
Order: Irom Combat Command Reapre alorted the Battalion at 0300 to be prepared to move on ordar to vicinity of Mackiller. - Orders ars to move out at 1000. Route of march - Mitterabein, Fenetrange, Nioderstineel, Nalfsicirchea, to Burbach. Bittalion assambled in vicinity 555355.

## 3 DEGRMEAR 1944

Battalion romainied in the ame assmably area. . Ordere camo tolajarty on modiv compary to asedet. in clearing Sarre Union. Sarre Unico bad bean: counterattaciobd by sereral onem tanks with infantiry earlier. "Al Company moved to vicindty 510345 after derk prepared to move on Sarre Doion at firat light;

The remainder of the Battalion was alorted to be propared to move on order after 07304 December 1944.

## 4. DPCGMERR 2944

nA". Compary moved into Sarre Union supported by ztth Infantry Divimica. Reported miseion complote at 0845. One enow tank (Ebandoned) and ond oniper tilied.

Battalion now in Combet Command "A.". Orders care to bo prepared to. more northeast through raak Force ODSN (35th IK Bn and 53rd Inf) after they haf fout tablioted a bridgebead over the river at Damfessel - Order of March in the Battation




Battalion was alerted to move a its mission at 1115. The miesion, whe to marah northeant and eacur the high ground vicindty Singling, Rohrbach-los-Hitabs, and-Bining. - These tewnd eore fartified town-in-the-Maginot Iine.

The attack rat carried out with the 37th Taik Battalion leading, is fantry and artillery euppoit mas coardinated in the beginuingo.. On reaching an atrea Inet couth of siniflint thettenke wive out of euppert of artiliony fire. Moot of the



orrars wro received to ascenlt blaing and Rohrbach whic CCB took Singling. The foroe encountered oneer piliboces and tireot antitank and tank fire. Yout of the onory resiotance wis oncountered from singling and the high ground about the town which hit our exposed Nafik. CCB had not jot came up to attack singling 80 it wan docided to talo this objective before preceeding an to ove ond- Inis was acocmplished anter overcoming utiff onemy resietance. in the
 magimelind to more into bining with wD Co in gupporte, This too maciacoopolishad against heavy enomy opposition and the force ocoupied and outposted the tove that night, if the time CCB had come up and-reliered the foroc in-singling it mes too dark for further action so the battalion (less D CO) assembled in the same position held yesterday.

Orders camo from Combat Coumand "A" to hold fast and ropell an cowntorattacksuntil we are relieved by the lath Armd. Dir.

## 7 DBCAGBER 2944

During the morning tank foree in Bening repuleed several eneng counterattacks. Bettalion ordered to move at 2100 to a vicinity 555355.

## 8 DECKM $18 B_{1} 194$

All elements were closed in bivouac by 0600 and at 0900 orders were received to proceed to vicinity of Uitteraheim.

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2-12 \text { DECKYARR } 1944
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No onery activity was encountered during this period. All time was spent in rocuperation and maintenance.

The disposition of troope in the Difision are as follows:

Combat Command "A". Combat Command "B" 35th Tank Bn 5lot And Inf Bn 10 th Armd Inf, Bn B/704 1D Bn B/489 AhA Bn A/46 Yed Bn A/126 Ord Bn $\qquad$

Bth Tank Bn

C/704 TD : Bo
N/489 AM Bn
B/46 yed Bn
B/126 Ord Bn

Combat Command Resorve Divisdon Trains 37th Tank Bn - 126th Ord (Hq) 53rd Armd Inf En 46 th Yed ( Bq ) A/704 ID Bn
489 AAN Hiq

144 th 518 Co 3804 Cas co 444 Trk Co C/489 kha H
lat $\mathrm{Pl} \mathrm{m}^{2}-16 \mathrm{~h} \cdot \mathrm{xH}$

## 13 DRCBIESRR 1944

At 71500 , orders wore isaned fram CCR to ajert one modium tank company, Thle comping wan to march to Achon to support the 87th Infantry Diviaion. $A_{A}$ : Compan received indera from the 87th Dirision that led thom to believe they would be comitted the following day.

4,-14 DSCBERR-124
W1w compan moved of af 0800 Yor area velnity of Achon pomandor of this

$x^{2}+6$

Itr. Hq 37 ith Tank $\mathrm{Bn}, 7$ Jan 1945 cont id:

## 15 DECOOEBR 184

Af 1500, Crdori woro roceivod Ifom tho Battalion Coumander to alart ther remainder of the bettalion and prepare immodistoly to move lomward in bupport of the 87th Diviaian. Battalion moved out at 1545 under command of the Precutive offlcer to vicinity $570460 \frac{1}{4}$ mi NE Oermingen. Orders wore iseued tore pre pared-to-move at 0715 in the morning- Oedor of March-Ren, $\mathrm{Hq}, \mathrm{Hq} \mathrm{CO}, \mathrm{D}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}$.

## 16 DECEMBKR 1944

Head of column moved out at-0715 and arrived in assembly-area 625543 2 mi NB of Hoclfling.
"C" Company was to relievo "A" Compans and be attached to the 347 th Infantry Regimont. ${ }^{\prime \prime} B^{n}$ Company was-attached-to the 345 th Infantry-Regiment.

Small arms mortar and artillery fire were met by our unate but advancing elements continued to proceod formard slowly. Ponetrations were made into Germany Proper. The first in the battalion wae "d! Compary in command of It. Falters.

## 17 DEEXPKR 1944

Pirst mord was received of enemy penetrations to the north (Belgive and Lucambourg).

Sevieral anti-tank guns were found in position and lostroyod. Penetrations were made into Germany Proper by the remaining companies of the battalice.

Heavy artillery and mortar fire being mot by our heading elements. The aupporting infantry experienced heary small arms and machine gun fire on same sectors.

Tanks were reported and seen in this sector and several were engaged at loag range.

## 18. DECFIBER 2944

Companies still in the same general area. Considerable difficulty was experienced in resuppiging the tanks due to artillery fire and the mud.

Reconnaisance platoon ot 111 doing the liaison work betweon the companies and battalion hoadquarters. prevented them from strafing or doing and accurate observation.

The battalion holding high ground just north and east of Nieder Gailbach.
Not much ohange in the situation is countomplated. Tbe onery appoars to be fighting atifi delaying action.

Ltr. Hq. 37th Tank Bn. 7 Jan 1945 cont'd:
19 DScerger 184
 sisted of artiliory and martar fire: Nature of terrain and mod provented ang oxtonel vo-eroop-country-manourering:
ardera were recelve that the Bettalion rould be relioved from ettach ment to the 87th Inf. Dir. and retwn to Mitterabeln and from there to a doetiu nation, unicnona as jot, in Bolgium. The risedon was to counter-attack, from the south, the German salient in tbe Ardennes.

Oinders were receired as to the route of march, time of departure, Route of March - Fenetrange, Bebeatraff, Morbange, Pont a Mouseon, Arbatille, Conflans, Longing. Time of Departure - 0830 .

The Divisicn now under III Corps control. 37th Tank En in "Ccan.

## 20 DECSMER 1944

-Battalion moved out at 0830 ; arrived in afibombly area $\ddagger$ mio south Mojx-10-1180, Belgitm-at-2330.-Saryice_CO_closed at-0700, 22-Deo 1944.

DISTR IBUITOS


## 21 IRCNEER 1944

Battalion remained in assembly at Moix-le-Tigo. Maintenance of vehiolos


## 22 DSCNEBR 1944

Vicinity C/R 2 miles N. Arian. arderre recelved from Hq "CCR" to movi out to N. at 0600. U1seion to contact onem clemante reported in-Ficinity-Flatisbourghaft to dortroy 111 oneqy lemente and procoed nothmard.

## 

## 33 DECNEER 1944

 D/37 will ramain. Route of Yarah - Porle, Holte to Platsbourghoff. Radio St $^{2}$
 Fhatsbourgboff. Assanlt and mortar platoons establistod OPa and registeredy
 the farm of mortar, mell-aras and direct Ar fire. Enoug infantry way woowtith
 adrabce wrois country with infantry mounted on tanke and the romainder in Dititricks. Artiliory proparationemare ladd on woode and possible Ar pooitionis.

Attick was Launched and objectives wore taken, ordersi ware-1esued to proceed on toward Bifonville. Befare Higonvilice could be reached it was too dark so the elemonts outposted the high. ground Narth of Flatsbourghoff. Loseog2 modivi tanks destroyed; 2 Of 11 cor and 3 EMKIA.

Enemy Losses: $2 \mathrm{SP}, 75 \mathrm{~mm}, 1$ German oporated Sherman tank; estimatod 30 onam doad.

Orders recolvod from Hiq CCR to launch an attack on Efgonviluo at, firat Light.

## 24 DBCMSESR 184

Battalion with Inf and Arty oupport to attack Higonville at 0800. Rësiatance was met frmodiately an ontering the town in the form of amall armo, artillery, barookas, and diroct At fire. The attack progreseod aloriy and by nightfall the thigh ground to thor north and aast of the village had boan takion and outposted. Infantry succeoded in cloaning out most of the torm.

Bnony casualties wore unknown dead. 428 prisoners (paratroopers, some being mosion), 39 American $\operatorname{Mi}$ and 3 officers who were prisoners were rescood, also 240 -mm Bofars. AA guns, $12 \frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, $11 \frac{1}{2}$ tan truck, $2 \frac{1}{4}$ ton truake, 1 water trailer were retaken.

The battalion hold dofensive positions on the high ground and awaited orders.

Orders recoived from CCR were to move at 1230 from our present position to the Division's loft llank.

Itr. Eq 37th Tank En. 7 Jan 1945 cont d:

## 25 Dec.uxen 1944

The head of the colun moved out from an area ST of BERCFIBCE at 2230, artar-having completed thirty (30) mile night march from HIGONVILIE. The ocmposition of the column was ie follows:

D/37
B/53
1 sqd. Eng. (Halftrack)
c/704
A/37
A/53
c/37
c/ 53
8/37
94th PA to support from peesent location
-. The immediate plan of action was as follows:
According to $\mathrm{S}-2$ information VAII IBS ROSIERES had very fow enomy in 1t. PETITE ROSIERES was known to contain more onery. $D / 37, B / 53$, Eng, and $C / 704$ were to continue through VALe IES ROSIERES in colum, and without halt. At PFTIIE ROSIERRS, D/37 would continve to march and take up a poadtion on the hight ground 18 of the village. Their position to be supplemonted by $\mathrm{C} / 704$. Captain. MaKahon, Bn S-2, was in command of this group.: B/53 was to clear the town out, which they did, taking eixty-Iive (65) prisoners.

The romainder of the colum was to turn E in PETITE ROSIERES and proceed toward NIVES, and COBREIIIE. The firet clement to turn here wasA/37; this coms pacy asoloted by $A / 53$ clearet futze. As this was going on $C / 37$ pTus $C / 53$ proceeded to COFRISVIIIS and cleared that town. This was complotod by 1430 . Artillery suph port on these towns was provided on call by the 94th FA. These fires were prearrangod.

It was reported by It. Boggess, CO Company "C", that the bridge jurt out of COBRBVIIIE on the raad to RFOOVIIIS had-beon blow, prodncing large crater. The balldozer was cordered forward and proceeded to 8171 the crater with a large otope wall that was nearby. The tanks of $C / 37$ and $A / 37$ overwatched this operation. rhis wiss completed at approcimately 1515 and C/37 plue C/53 proceoded to high ground W of REMOVIISE and orerlooking the tow. $A / 37$ plus $A / 53$ proceeded into Breorins on the road, all guns firing and supported by direct fire fram c/37. As $A / 37 \mathrm{and} 1 / 53$ proceeded to clear the town, $C / 37$ and $C / 53$ moved domand alons the edge of town phile this Fas going on B/ 37 took upi pogitich on high
 Reworlins was cleared, the tom maseoutported and $A$ and $B / 37$ occhanged pladitions; and $C / 37$ took up a position II of the tomm. There was no artillery firo on this tonn dre to the prociaity of CB on the E Flank. Over three hundred (300) prisobirs ware takon Irom the tom. The command opent the night of $25-26$ Dicant?

[^0]Itr. Hq 37th Tank Bn. 7 dan 1945 cont id:

## 26 DECRMBER 1944

 Simultanooualy as the tanks and infantry stattod moving $N$, and the artillery was pouring it on, the P-47s started to bomb and strafo. The BOIS de COHET was given good doing over. The coordination of tanks, infantry, artillory, and air wes to porfeotion.- Planes came ovor tanks at antenne altitude and atrafod to the froot The combination of artiliery and planes took care of the Bois de Corier, which was the unkiom quantity.

In the attack on PBMICHANPAGEB $\mathrm{B} / 37$ and $\mathrm{B} / 53$ paralleled the 15 road from Rrolillis to reiichanfagns and swung over and into REHICHANPMGIE from the S. C/37 pius C/53 moved to the $N$ of the town covarthe-tbe town, and wore xoidy to support with direct fire. Artillery pire was kept on the town as long as
 cloared up, $B / 37$ and $B / 53$ mored to a position just ST of CLOCHDLOMr, and overlooking that town. Artillory fire was put on CLOCHINOKN, $\mathrm{C} / 37 \mathrm{amd} \mathrm{C} / 53$ moved to a poaition about one (1) kilometor NH of RESICHAMPACRE to cover in direction of SIPRET and VIIIEROUK. At approdimately 1500 and continuing for almost an hour, hundreds of C-47s came over and flew to BMSTOCNE dropping suppilios to the garrisca there.

At 1520, It. Col. Abrams called up Captain Coright; Bn 9-3; and ardered him to bring $C / 37$ and $C / 53$ forward to $B / 37$ 's position, saying"this is it".

Opon reaching $B / 37$ 's position the orders wera given by Colonal Abrams. They were as fallows:
 untifecontact finmade with elements of the lolst Airborne Division. B/53 Tili follion and will clean out ASSENOIS. $C / 37$ and $C / 53$ will be under coumand of Captain Dúight and will be supported throe (3) Battalions of 105 and one (1) Battaliont of 155 mm artillery. Artillery to be on call fram angone in the force and to be lifted by call. The artillery will hit the tom of ASSENOIS and the odges of both woode to the 8 of ASSENOIS.

Aftor all tank commanders and infantry platoon leaders wore givon the situation the force moved out at 1610, tanks leading, as is customary.

Opon coming into sight of ASSENOIS, It, Boggess, called for the propared artillery fire. The fire came like the raineg fow if any rounds misaing thoir-mark.-AE the odge of the town was roachod Boggess chlled for the fire to lift and proceeded into the tom without waiting for the fire to cease.立 windue to the heavy artillery fire two tanke ware unable to find the ir way through torm. one infantify halftrack got forward into the tank colume ooe halftrack auffered a direct hit in the town. None of the tanke wore fired upon by the oneng in the toma, although there was conoidreable inefrective ant1-tank firo 85 the colvin approached tbe town.

Ae the force left assemois it, was composed as follows It. Boggess! tank, It, mrolisco's tank, anothor tank, a break in the colum of approcimatoly 300 yerte, en trfuntry hairtrack, anothint tank and tho s-3ie tank. Ail ment mil as the force proceeded on, firing 30 callbre machine guns into the woode on both
sides of the roal.

 road in a bottle neck areated by the woods. The infantry half-track hit one of thome minos and wae destrojed, catching fire immediatoly. Aftor the mines word throwinto the ditches, the wark being done under cover of 50 calibre fire frow tank, the two raining tanks continvod- on the rojolined the loading olement which of this tine ( 1650 ) had contacted elaments of the 326th Enginears of the 100et Airbcrne Division. In the moantime, $\mathrm{E} / 53$ started to clear out Assissois, and colonel Abrams started forwardc.with the remainder of $\mathrm{C} / 53$ and two $\mathrm{C} / 37$ tenx By this time there mas considerable activity in ASSENOIS which containod an onstry Battulion and Regimental-CPs.-Some-428-prisoners-more finally taken fram-the tomo. $\therefore$ - During this $t$ imo Captain Duight wa mot by Brigadier conoral Hanultro, acting Commanding Genoral of the 101st Airborne Division, who came to the porimeter defonses of basTocins.

By 1830, all of $C / 37$ and $Q / 53$ had taken up pooitions on the perimeter dafonse. Colonel Abrams went to the lolot Airborpe Divielion CP to make arrangamonte to get thoir trains through. $\mathrm{C} / 53$ loot five (5) half-tracks on the mision. 000 by our own artillery, one by mines, and three by basooka fire. It nas ob-t vious, after the battle, that the force would have had considerable trouble it it had waited for the artiliery to lift.

Colonol abramis called Colonel Jacques-at approcimatoly 1930 and asked to have $A / 53$ come up and clear the odges to the woode North of ASsknoIS.
$5 \quad 27-28$ DECSIESR-2944

Tho edges to the woods NCRTH of ASSENOIS as requestod wore cleared hy 0300, Docember 27, 1944; the road was safe for passage of all types of vohicles. This task mas porformod againot otrong enemis opposition and in an boavily wooded area.

D/37 eacorted the trains of the l01st and 10th Armored into BASTOCans. The trains consisted of some forty (40) trucks and seventy (70) ambulances. Up to this time: $D / 37$ has covered the NF flank from the same genoral area it took up on the 25th.

In the area betwoon CLOCHILCNT and ASSENOIS wore soven (7) anti-tank gund of 75 man or larger; one blocking the entrance to ASSEBOIS. . Botween ASSENOIS and the perimetor dofence of BLSTOGAE wore eight (8) more guns. In the woods on

 oneng soldiore. The above weapons wore inoffective due to fast, doalofve movermint, and accurato; woll coordinated artillery fire, coupled with excellont air support.

During the above oporations the etrength of the line companies never L_Ceceded the figures below:


Ltre Ho 37th Tank Bn: 7 Jan 1945 cont: d

At 0925, the artillory opened up on REMICHMEROM, and the EGI D6 COMCH Simultianoously as the tanke and infrintry startod moving li, and the artillary was pouring it on, the p-47s started to bomb and strafo. The nors de colirit mas givert sood soing over. Tho coordination of trnks, infentry, ertillery, end alr was- to porifotion. Planes come over tanks at antenna altitude and strafed to the front The oombination of artiliary and-planes-took cara of the BOIS de COillt, milich Was the unknow quantity.
 from RELIOVILLE to REMICHAMPAGIE and smung over and into RELICHAMPARA from tho S. $\mathrm{C} / 37$ plus $\mathrm{C} / 53$ moved to the 7 of the town-covering the town, and zere ready to support $\pi$ ith direct fire. Artillgry fire was kopt on the tom as lone as possible and then aupplanted by drect fire from C/ 37 . Than RGicilalpacise ras oloarod up, $B / 37$ and $B / 53$ moved to a position just $5 N$ of CLOCiINONT, and ovorlooking that tom. Artillary fire was put on CLOCinncinT, C/37 and C/53 movad to: a position about one (1) kilometer NI of RiniCliAlPACNE to cover the NN flank. At the present stage the time ras approximately 1430 . A/37 movnd to the high ground in of CLOCHINONT to cover in direction of SIBRET and VILDROUX. At approximataly 1500 and continuing for almost an hour, hundteds of $C-47 \mathrm{~s}$ cane over and Flev to BASTOUN dropping aupplies to the garrison there. -

At 1520, Lt. Coi. Abraria callad up Captain Dripht, $\mathrm{Bn} \mathrm{S-3}$, and ordered him to bring $C / 37$ and $C / 53$ formard to $B / 37$ 's position, saying " 5 his is it".....

Upon reaching $B / 37^{\prime}$ s position the orders were given by Colonal Abrames
Thoy wore as follown
C/37 and $C / 53$, II march on ASSENOY5, go through and cont inue on until contact is mado with elaments of the $1018 t$ Airborno Division. B/53 will follow and Till clean out ASSENOIS. C/37 and C/53 FIII be under ootmend of. Captain Duight and aivill be sunnorted by throe (3) Battalions of 105 and one (1) Battalion of l55nm artillery. Artiliery to be on call from anyone in the forco and to bo iifted by oall. The artillery will hit the tom of ASSENOIS and the edges of both woods to the N of ASSEROIS.

After all tank comhnders and infintry platoon lenders mere riven the situation the force moved out at 1610 , tanks loading, ns is customary.

Upon coming into sight of ASSENOIS, Lt. Bogress, colled for the propared artilley firo. The fire come likg the rains, few if any rounds miseing their mark. As the edge of the tom tris renched Borgess callnd for the fire to lift and procesded into the tom 7 ithout riting for the fire to censc.

Dua to the hagy artillery. fire tro tanks merg unable to find their Weythrough town. one infantry holftrack got. formard into the tank column. one
 by the onemy in the town, although there was considerable ineffoctito antiotant ifro as the column approachod the tom.

As the forco left ASSENOIS it was composed as follows Lt. Boggess' tank, Lt. Urolson's tank, another tank, broak in tho colum of approximately 300 yards, $8 n$ infantry halftrack, another tank and tho s-3's tank. ill went woll: as the foroolprocoeded on, firing 30 calibre mechine_euns into the wonds_on both: sides of the road.

Ltr. Hq 37thaTank Bn. 7 Jan 1945 oont'ds

## 26 DECE2BER 1944 CONT'D.

 -road in-bottle nock croated by the-moods. The infantry half-traok-hfit one of theso mines and was'destroyed, catching fire immedintely. Aftar the minas rero throm-into the ditches, the -ork being done under cover of 50 calibre fire from a-tank, the two remaining tanks continued on ond rojoinod the leading aloriont Which by this time (1650) had contacted olements of the 32cth Enginoerg of the 101st Alrborne-Division. In the menntime, $-1 / 53$ started to clecr out ASSLiioIs, and Colonel Abrais started formard-rith the remaindor of C/53 and - tivo $C / 37$ tank. By this time there mas considerable activity in ASSENOIS which containod an onomy Battalion and Rogimantal CPs. Some 428 prisoners mere finnlly taken from the tord.

During this time Captain Dright was met by Brigadior Genaral HoAuliffoi, acting Commanding Genoral of the 101st Airborne Divieion, who care to the perimeter -dofenses of BASTOGNE.

By 1830, all of C/37 and C/53 had takon up position on tho porlmetor defonso. Colonel Abrams yent to the 101st Airbarno Division CP to mako arrangoments to get thoir trains through. C/53 lost fivo (5) half-tracks on the misaiort One by our own artillery, one by mines, and three by bazooka fire. It mas obrious, aftor the battio, that the force rould have had considerable trouble if it had waited for the artillery to. lift.

Colonel Abrams called Colonol Jacques at approximatoly 1930 and askod have $A / 53$ come up and cloar the odges to the wood worth of ASSEFOIS.

## 27 DECELBER, 1944

 This december 27, 1944; the road ras safe for passage of all typos of vehiclies. aroa.
$D / 37$ escorted the trains of the 101 st and 10 th Armored into BASTOGNe. The trains consisted of some-forty ( 40 ) trucks and seventy (70) ambulances. Up to this tife $D / 37$ has covered the in flank from the gnme general area it took up on the 25th.

In the aren betmeon CLOCIILLOIT and ASSENOIS Fere seven (7) anti-tank. guns of 75 ma or larger, one blocking the ontrance ta ASSENOIS. Betmeen ASSENDIS and the perimeter defense of BASTOGF were eight (8) mors guns. In the roods on both sides of the road il of 世SENOIS rere 25-30 essortec enemy vehiclof ; inoluding full track prime movers. There res at least one bazooka to every fivo.(5) onemy soldiers. The above ¥oapons mere ineffective due to fast, decisive movement, and accurate, well coordinated artillery fire, coupled tith excellent air support.

During the above operations the strength of the line comparies never دي


Winch of the jue the operative vantcles vere below those shom.

Itr, Hq 37th Tank Bn, 7 Jan 1045 cont'd:
28. DECEIBER, 1944

Boribers mere over agnin at 0500 this morning... The day broke oloudy and did not look good as Par as air support for troops in zastogno.

C/37 received small arms fire from woods to their Southeast at 1000 . "B" Company Fas alertod to eid the 53rd in oleaning out some woods botroon the rond up rifoh 78 had advancod and the mancoac Just North of Assenols. Fog was heavy making visibility almost nil. No onemy 7ere found in the woods.

Ren Platoon rent to Assenols in search of a sultablo dattrion CP:
A plntoon of the 467 th AAA Battalion was attached 0 the 37 th for _ apport-against air attack. Plans rere ade to open fire on enemy planes tonifit.

Lt. Col. Abrams has gone to Division to soo the Comandine Ceneral.
" $A$ " and "B" Companies mere still In position keeping open the supply
routes.
$29^{\prime}$ DECEMBER, 1944
At 0030, a call came from the 101st Airborne to be alert for a possible push from the North and lorthoast. Captain Lamson was crilled Zo
 Liaison officer. Captain Lamigon roturned with word that mo wore to move to the vicinity of Cloohimont, 515522.
at 1900, Bastogne mas bombed and strafod by an unknown number of onemy planes. A number of near hits were scored on our Battalion area. 以ajor: Bautz's tank was nearly hit. A direct hit was scored on "B" Company's kitohon truck. One man was soriousiy injured. The Battalion cooperated with the anti-airoraft platoon-in firing on the planes.

The area mis bombed about six (6) times during the night. The last

- sive attacks rere lighter than the iirst. In the course of the night, three (3) onemy planes were downed..

Orders mero received to move to Clochimont at 0900, tomorrom morning.
30-DECELBER, 1944



At 0900, the Battalion mored out for Clochimont nnd arrived there at 0945. The order of march was Ho CO, D, A, B, C, and Sorvice elements.

A Company Comminders motting an hold. Counterattacks mndo during the night kad beon repulsed. Fo were to be roady to move at anytme in the event of an attack on olther flank. Roports indreted that onemy in U. 5 . uniformis. are infiltrating through our Innes:

SHEBET
Itr, Hiq 37 th'Tank $\mathrm{Bn}, 7$ Jox 2245 , e ont'd $\qquad$
$\qquad$

Colonol Blanchard of CCR brocient ordnes at 1545 for un to movo vioin解y of Chamont; 518488, to be-1n-position-in oase of an attack from F: flank,
$\qquad$ Tho Battalion moved out-nt-1620. The order of march mas Ren; Hy fin $\mathrm{Hq} \mathrm{Co}, \mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{and.C} .\mathrm{The} \mathrm{Battalion} \mathrm{nryived} \mathrm{at-the} \mathrm{assombly} \mathrm{aren} \mathrm{at}. \mathrm{1700.}$.

31 DECETBENZ 1944
$\qquad$
For, a change, the night was quiet as was thig morning. Durine the night_onomy aireraft strafed our bivouac aroa, horever, no damago rasultod. $\qquad$ For the Battalion Commander: $\qquad$

2 Incls:
Incl $\ddagger 1$ - Overlays InclП\# 2-Journal


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37至 TANK BN
Sournal-Dec 1944




ป2URNAL FRACE

TO 5 Decenber 2944





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FRNt. $\qquad$ -22 Desamber. 1944


FKNE, 22 Doonmbor, 1944
TT 22 DAcambar 1844

$J \cap U R N A L$
$\qquad$
FFN!. 22 Docambere 1944
TO Z3 Docombers 1944






$$
\underline{U} \cap \underline{U} \underline{R} \underset{P}{N} \underset{\sim}{L} C E
$$

$\qquad$ TO ... 23 Docdmber, 1944 .


Whr 种

 $\qquad$

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\text { FFin:- Decomber 23, } 1214 \\
70 \text { Deoomber 23, } 1244
\end{array}
$$

$$
\text { an- }-\quad \text { T0, Deoomber 23, } 1944
$$



Fll , 24 Docombor, 1964
Tn 24 Decombor, 1941



$$
\underline{U} \cap \underline{U} \mathbb{N} \underbrace{}_{P L A C E}
$$

PRM, 24 Docomber, 1944

TO 25 Dosember, 1944


$$
J \cap \cup R-\frac{A}{\text { PEACE }}
$$

$\qquad$
HFI. 24 Docomber, 1944

$$
\text { TO 24 Decomber, } 1944
$$






JーUR N $-\frac{L}{\operatorname{PLACE}}$
FKCl. 24 December, 1944
TO 24 December, 1944

$\qquad$ $-$
FKOL. - 24 December, 1944
IO 24. Docomber -2944


TO 24 December, 1944


FFN: $\quad 25$ vacombnr, 1944
In 25 Doconber, 1944


$$
\begin{aligned}
& 4 \\
& \text { FROL: } 26 \text { Docnmber, } 2944 \\
& \text { In } 26 \text { Decomber, } 1944
\end{aligned}
$$

$\qquad$

$\underset{\sim}{\square}-\underline{U} \cdot \underline{I}-\frac{L}{P A C E}$
Fril 26 Jncombor, 1944

Tn 26 Dncombor, 1944


$$
\underline{J} \simeq \underline{U}-\frac{N}{A} \frac{L}{F R C E}
$$

FFint, 26 Docomber, 1911

TO 26 December, 1944


FRM - 26 Docornbor, 1344
TO 25 Docomber, 1944




$\qquad$



Scuta to Baum - There is no chance in the disposition of our troops in Chorea $\frac{1}{4}$ to mn. Eautz to COR - In ramada bout mosshar you ant barren, about using tom for iago. Do for: morn this tom.
 taking care of it. They are at the die of atolls to Leach's front.
COR to zoutz - Did you have message Str me? Raw to 7 - Inf rots tho Roger tom is $\because$ d the tom 70 took this morning.



$$
\pm \cap \because R-\frac{N}{M A C E}
$$

VKn, $\frac{20 \text { Docombor, } 1944}{26 \text { Dacnmbor, } 1944}$


## 

$\qquad$
ThM _ 26 Deorbbnt, $19: 4$
$20 \quad 26$ Dncnmber, 1944

Fins Aeserves ars doing tho pholo theng.


WHR
TO 26 Docombar. 2044

2autz - Con I mrot you?
Alrachard - Yea.
Donchus to 7 - Is 2 there "ith you port?
Should I Ineve that pout of my outit out there?
3 to Eoness - :ion ner you doing?

nom? over theres
30 sth mrinoors roscued.
02 to 7 to $\because$ imer nemeunrtors - ne have orntretod
unst requirod.
20-ress to ? - ? yo renchod obinctito.
3 to 7ormess - consolid to.
3 to -grease - You hove n tark hocle fup harr
motre him move.
Whose monje up :iorth havo bone comtnotod $\therefore 10,45$.

IJnotherd to -nutz - Tind issembly hoo for

INs that mysionl contert or Abn pertonally?

60 to 7 - sond lise. los - pick assenbly aree for
antiro comand.: - . ......
ibe to 7 - The tholu ruai - abiaze. Thero ip fighting going on.

$$
\underline{Z} \cup \underline{Q} \underset{\sim}{N L}
$$

Fin: $\frac{25 \text { Decomber } 1944}{26 \text { Docombor, } 1944}$


$$
\underline{\square} \because \underline{R}-\frac{\mathrm{L}}{\mathrm{LACE}}
$$

Frin: ar andaminr. 2044
TO $\qquad$

3 THAT TINESEKTIL
-


J $\because \because R M K$
${ }_{2} \mathrm{Ce}$
Vin _ 23 Docombatanat 1944
in $\qquad$


$$
\pm \simeq \because \frac{\mathrm{R}}{-1 \mathrm{~L}} \frac{\mathrm{~L}}{\mathrm{HACE}}
$$


T0 30 Dncmibar, 1944

 $\qquad$
Finl. 90 FAndAham, 19.4
20
31 jocombar, 1044


LOI Q1 LE\&


[^0]:    "-ber in the positions:

